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Battle of Mycale

Coordinates: 37°41′27″N 27°09′27″E / 37.6909°N 27.1574°E / 37.6909; 27.1574
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Battle of Mycale
Part of the Second Persian invasion of Greece and the Greek counterattack
Color photograph of a barren grey mountain, with a small forest at its foothills. Ruined Greek columns can be seen in front of the forest.
Part of Mount Mycale, viewed from the ruins of Priene.
DateAugust 27, 479 BC
Location
Mycale, Ionia
(modern-day Aydın, Turkey)
Result Greek victory
Territorial
changes		 Persia loses the Aegean islands, Ionia begins second revolt against Persian rule
Belligerents
 Achaemenid Empire
Commanders and leaders
Strength
40,000 men
110-250 ships		 60,000 men
300 ships
Casualties and losses
Considerable[1] Most of the army and all the ships[1]

The Battle of Mycale (Ancient Greek: Μάχη τῆς Μυκάλης; Machē tēs Mykalēs) was one of the two major battles (the other being the Battle of Plataea) that ended the second Persian invasion of Greece during the Greco-Persian Wars. It took place on or about August 27, 479 BC on the slopes of Mount Mycale, on the coast of Ionia, opposite the island of Samos. The battle was fought between an alliance of the Greek city-states, including Sparta, Athens and Corinth, and the Persian Empire of Xerxes I.

The previous year, the Persian invasion force, led by Xerxes himself, had scored victories at the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium, and conquered Thessaly, Boeotia and Attica; however, at the ensuing Battle of Salamis, the allied Greek navies had won an unlikely victory, and therefore prevented the conquest of the Peloponnese. Xerxes then retreated, leaving his general Mardonius with a substantial army to finish off the Greeks the following year.

In the summer of 479 BC, the Greeks assembled an army, and marched to confront Mardonius at the Battle of Plataea. At the same time, the allied fleet sailed to Samos, where the demoralized remnants of the Persian navy were based. The Persians, seeking to avoid a battle, beached their fleet below the slopes of Mycale, and, with the support of a Persian army group, built a palisaded camp. The Greek commander Leotychides decided to attack the Persians anyway, landing the fleet's complement of marines to do so.

Although the Persian forces put up stout resistance, the heavily armoured Greek hoplites again proved themselves superior in combat, and eventually routed the Persian troops, who fled to their camp. The Ionian Greek contingents in the Persian army defected, and the camp was assailed, with a large number of Persians slaughtered. The Persian ships were then captured and burned. The complete destruction of the Persian navy, along with the destruction of Mardonius' army at Plataea (allegedly on the same day as the Battle of Mycale), decisively ended the invasion of Greece. After Plataea and Mycale, the allied Greeks would take the offensive against the Persians, marking a new phase of the Greco-Persian Wars. Although Mycale was in every sense a decisive victory, it does not seem to have been attributed the same significance (even at the time) as, for example, the Athenian victory at the Battle of Marathon or even the Greek defeat at the Battle of Thermopylae.

Background

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Main articles: Greco-Persian Wars, First Persian invasion of Greece, and Second Persian invasion of Greece

After Xerxes I was crowned the emperor of the Achaemenid Empire, he quickly resumed preparations for the invasion of Greece, including building two pontoon bridges across the Hellespont. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed, generally referred to as the Allies.[2] In August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes's approach, a small Allied army led by the Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the Pass of Thermopylae, whilst an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium. Famously, the vastly outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persians army for six days in total, before being outflanked by the Persians who used an unknown mountain path.[3]

A map centered on modern day Greece, Bulgaria and Western Turkey showing the territories of the Achaemenid Empire and the Greek city states.
A map showing the Greek world at the time of the battle.

After Thermopylae, the Persian army had burned and sacked the Boeotian cities which had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae, before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The allied army, meanwhile, prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth.[4] The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point in the conflict. Following the defeat of his navy at Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with a minor portion of his army.[4]

Xerxes left Mardonius with most of his army. Mardonius decided to camp for the winter in Thessaly.[4] The Athenians then reoccupied their destroyed city.[5] Over the winter, there seems to have been some tension among the Allies. In particular, the Athenians, who were not protected by the Isthmus, but whose fleet were the key to the security of the Peloponnese, felt hard done by, and demanded an allied army march north the following year.[5] When the Allies failed to commit to this, the Athenian fleet refused to join the Allied navy in spring. The navy, now under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides, thus skulked off Delos, whilst the remnants of the Persian fleet skulked off Samos, both sides unwilling to risk battle.[6] Similarly, Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was pointless, whilst the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponnese.[5]

A map centered on southern Greece showing the movements of the Greek army with dark blue arrows and the Persian army with red arrows.
Movements of the Persian and Greek armies in 480–479 BC.

Meanwhile, the Athenian navy under Xanthippus had joined with the Allied fleet off Delos. They were then approached by a delegation from Samos under the leadership of Hegesistratos, who suggested that the Ionian cities were eager to revolt. They furthermore pointed out the poor morale and reduced seaworthiness of the Persian fleet. Leotychides and the council of war decided to attempt this maneuver, and sailed for Samos.[7] Leotychides found Hegesistratos' name to be a good omen, since it meant "Army Leader". The delegation from Samos, as envoys of their nation, pledged their loyalty to the Hellenic alliance.[8]

Opposing forces

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Persians

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The number of Persian ships and men involved with the battle is, as so often in the Greco-Persian Wars, somewhat problematic. It is clear that the Persian fleet did not dare conduct operations against the Greeks, and thus must have been approximately equal to, or smaller than the Greek fleet.[9][10] Herodotus gives the size of the Persian fleet at 300 ships;[10] the Greeks had 378 at Salamis, but must have suffered significant losses, and so they probably also had around 300 in total (though not necessarily all these ships formed part of the allied fleet for 479 BC).[9] The Phoenician ships were dismissed from the Persian fleet before the battle, which reduced its strength further.[11]

An illustration on a circular surface in golden-yellow watercolor. A standing Greek soldier with a unicorn shield is sword fighting with a lunging Persian soldier wearing a drooping cap.
Greek hoplite (right) and Persian warrior (left), fighting each other. Ancient kylix, 5th century BC.

Diodorus tells us that to guard the camp and the ships the Persians gathered 100,000 men in total,[12] while Herodotus suggests that there were 60,000 men in the army under the command of Tigranes.[11] Squaring these two accounts, might suggest that there were c. 40,000 men with the fleet. Given that the Persian fleet appears to have been undermanned in the aftermath of Salamis, 200-300 ships would indeed give this number of naval personnel (using Herodotus's standard complement of 200 men per ship).[13] However, this total of 100,000 is probably too high; to accommodate 100,000 men and 200+ ships, the Persian camp would have to have been enormous. Estimates made of Mardonius' huge camp at Plataea, which was planned and built with plenty of time, suggest it might have accommodated 70,000-120,000 men;[14][15] it is improbable that such a large camp could have been built at Mycale in the time-frame that Herodotus suggests. It is therefore possible that the 60,000 quoted by Herodotus is actually the total number of Persians present at Mycale; the Persians certainly outnumbered the Allies, emerging from the palisade in confidence after seeing the smaller number of the Allied troops.[16][17]

Tigranes was the commander of the Persian land forces at Mycale.[18] Artaÿntes was the joint commander of the Persian fleet, and he appointed his nephew, Ithamitres, as the third commander of the fleet.[19]

The Persian force of 60,000 most likely consisted of spearmen and archers from the various contingents of Persians, Medes, and Red Sea Islanders, though a small force of Persian cavalry was also recruited into the army. In addition to the Persians, Medes, and Red Sea Islanders, there were also some contingents of Greek mercenaries in the Persian army at Mycale, but Herodotus wrote that these later defected over to the Greeks during the main battle outside the Persian camp of Mount Mycale.

Greeks

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The numbers of ships and men for the Allies are also somewhat problematic. Herodotus claims that Leotychides had 110 triremes under his command.[20] However, the previous year, the allies had fielded 271 triremes at the Battle of Artemisium, and then 378 at the Battle of Salamis.[21][22] We are also told that the Allies had "command of the sea" after Salamis, which implies that they could at least equal the Persian fleet.[9] Diodorus, on the other hand, tells us the allies had 250 ships, which is more consistent with their force levels of the previous year.[12] These two numbers can be reconciled by assuming that Leotychides had 110 triremes under his command before being joined by Xanthippus and the Athenian ships, after the Allied army had marched out from the Peloponnesus. This is the approach taken by Holland, and gives a naval force which might well match the remnants of the Persian fleet.[16] The historian Andrew Robert Burn [Wikidata] estimates the Greek fleet to have had 110 ships.[23] Burn notes that the figure of 250 ships is only stated by Ephorus.[7]

Although the Athenians had sent 8,000 hoplites to Plataea, they would still have had ample manpower to man a large fleet of triremes, especially since rowers tended to be of the lower classes (the thetes) who could not afford the equipment to fight as hoplites.[24] The standard complement of a trireme was 200 men, including 14 marines.[25] Furthermore, the Chian ships at the Battle of Lade also carried 40 marines each. This suggests that a trireme could probably carry a maximum of 40–45 soldiers—triremes seem to have been easily destabilized by extra weight.[26] Burn notes that the Greek contingent of marines was strong, and considers the possibility that some of the Greek oarsmen could have served as light infantry.[7]

Strategic and tactical considerations

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From a strategic point of view, battle was not necessary for either side; the main strategic theatre was mainland Greece itself. Although destroying the enemy navy would result in a clear strategic advantage for both sides, attempting this risked the loss of their own navy. The actions of the two sides thus reflect more upon their morale and confidence than on any strategic considerations. The Persians, seeing little to gain in battle, demoralized and riven with dissent, thus sought to avoid a naval battle.[11][9][10][12] Conversely, the Allies, who had initially been as nervous of a battle as the Persians,[27] sought to press home their morale advantage once they were informed of the state of the Persian fleet.[28]

Tactically, the Persian fleet should have held the advantage at sea, since the Athenian part of the Greek fleet was, despite their efforts at Artemisium and Salamis, still raw in seamanship.[29] However, whether because of their low morale, or because they were in fact outnumbered, the Persians sought instead the tactical advantage of joining up with the army under Tigranes, and fortifying a position.[28][11] However, when the Greeks chose to fight on land, the Persians then threw away the advantage of their fortifications by emerging to fight the Greeks in the open field.[12] Furthermore, as Marathon and Thermopylae had shown, large numbers conferred little advantage against the more heavily armored hoplites; thus, as the battle began, it was the Greeks who had the tactical upper hand.[30]

Prelude

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A color terrain map focused on northwestern Turkey and the islands of Greece. Mount Mycale is at the top center, Lade island is to its immediate south, Samos is to its immediate west and Miletus is to Lade's immediate east.
Map showing position of Mount Mycale in relation to Lade, Samos and Miletus.

When the Persians heard that the Allied fleet was approaching, they set sail from Samos towards the Ionian mainland, possibly because they had decided they could not fight a naval battle. During the chaos of their retreat, the Samians freed 500 Athenian captives.[31] They sent the Phoenician ships away (Herodotus does not explain why), and then sailed to the shore near Mount Mycale.[11] Xerxes had left an army there, under the command of Tigranes, to guard Ionia.[11] The Persians beached their ships, built a palisade around them, and prepared to guard the makeshift fort.[32] The historian Andrew Robert Burn [Wikidata] argues that the Persian fleet had anchored at Mycale because their commanders thought it would be "useless to fight at sea".[23]

The Persians took away the armor and weapons of the Samians in their army, finding them unreliable. Furthermore, they sent the Milesians to their rear to guard the passes over Mycale, suspecting that the Milesians might also defect. To the south of these passes, on the beaches on the route from Samos, the Persians moored their fleet behind the cover of rocks, and built abatis (field fortifications) with the wood they had cut recently. With their preparations in place, the Persians decided to defend their position.[31]

The Greeks encamped at Kalamoi, adjacent to the Heraion of Samos. Because their opponent was inactive, there were plans to not fight a battle, and instead attack the Persian communications centre at the Hellespont. However, they decided to attack their opponent and his fleet, and moved towards Mycale. The Greek fleet moved towards the shore and called on the Ionians to revolt. The Greeks then sailed farther and embarked the soldiers, in a location beyond the line of sight of their opponents. Herodotus reports that as the Allied Greeks approached the Persian camp, rumor spread amongst them of an Allied victory at Plataea earlier on in the day.[31]

It is probable that the relatively small number of marines that the Allies had disembarked for the battle made them overconfident, encouraging the Persians to leave the safety of their camp.[16] Their morale boosted by this omen, they set forth to win their own victory.[33] Green suggests that following the victory at Plataea, the Allied commander Pausanias took control of the Persian beacon system that Xerxes had used to communicate with Asia, and used it to send the news of the victory at Plataea to the Allied fleet.[34]

The battle

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Schematic diagram of the Battle of Mycale.

The Allies probably formed into two wings. On the right were the Athenians, Corinthians, Sicyonians and Troezenians; around half of the army, who took up positions starting from the shore and ending at the foothils of Mount Mycale. On the left were the Spartans with the other contingents, deployed on the hills in uneven terrain. The battle commenced in the afternoon, when the right wing began fighting with the Persians while the left wing was still crossing the hills. The Persians moved out from their camp and put up their shield wall. Burn argues that Tigranes wanted to vanquish half of the Greeks facing him while the other half was not present.[35]

The Greek right, under arrow volleys, decided to fight in close quarters. Until the Persian shield wall was unbroken, the Persians defended their position. The Greeks managed to break through the wall by shoving. The Persians fought back initially, but then broke their lines and escaped to their camp. The soldiers of the right wing followed them into the camp, and most of the Persian soldiers fled from the camp, except the ethnic Persian troops, who grouped together and fought the Allied soldiers who had entered the camp. Finally, the left wing arrived, outflanking the camp and falling on the rear of the remaining Persian forces, thereby completing the rout.[36]

Herodotus tells us that, on seeing the outcome of the battle hung in the balance, the disarmed Samians had joined in on the side of the allies, doing what they could. This inspired the other Ionian contingents to turn on the Persians as well. Meanwhile, the Milesians who were guarding the passes of Mycale also turned on the Persians. At first they misdirected the fleeing Persian contingents so that they ended up back amongst the Allied troops; then, perhaps seeing the outcome of the battle was certain, they began killing the fleeing Persians.[37] The Greeks then burned the Persian fleet after a heavily contested fight with the Persian marines,[23] after taking out the loot from the ships to the beach.[38]

Herodotus does not mention specific figures for casualties, merely saying that losses were heavy on both sides.[39] The Sicyonians in particular suffered, also losing their general Perilaus.[37] On the Persian side, the admiral Mardontes and the general Tigranes were both killed, though Artaÿntes and Ithamitres escaped.[40] Herodotus says that a few Persian troops escaped the battle and made their way to Sardis.[41] Diodorus claims that there were 40,000 Persian casualties, and also suggests that the survivors made their way to Sardis.[17]

Aftermath

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Main articles: Battle of Plataea and Greco-Persian Wars

With the twin victories of Plataea and Mycale, the second Persian invasion of Greece was over. Moreover, the threat of a future invasion was abated; although the Greeks remained worried that Xerxes would try again, over time it became apparent that the Persian desire to conquer Greece was much diminished.[42]

The Greeks returned to Samos and discussed their next moves.[43] The Allied fleet then sailed to the Hellespont to break down the pontoon bridges, but found that this had already been done. The Peloponnesians sailed home, but the Athenians remained to attack the Chersonesos, still held by the Persians. The Persians in the region, and their allies, made for Sestos, the strongest town in the region, and the Athenians laid siege to them there. After a protracted siege, Sestos fell to the Athenians, marking the beginning of a new phase in the Greco-Persian Wars, the Greek counterattack.[44] Herodotus ended his Histories after the siege of Sestos. Over the next 30 years, the Greeks, primarily the Athenian-dominated Delian League, would expel the Persians from Macedon, Thrace, the Aegean islands and Ionia.[45] Peace with Persia finally came in 449 BC with the Peace of Callias, finally ending the half-century of warfare.[45] Aristogenes, the tyrant of Miletus, was overthrown by the Spartans, but the Persians continued to exercise influence in Asia Minor, even its coastal areas, for a long time after the battle.[38]

After the battle, there were concerns over how the Greeks of Asia Minor could be defended from Persian vengeance. The Peloponnesians suggested a population exchange, where the Greeks who did not want to live under Persian rule would be relocated in northern Greece, on the properties of the medizers who would be expelled. However, since all of northern Greece had surrendered to the Persians, this plan was abandoned. Also, Xanthippus had claimed that the Greeks of Asia Minor were Athenian settlers, and thus Athens would not let their settlements be abandoned. Burn found this idea of a population exchange to have parallels with the population exchange between Greece and Turkey implemented 24 centuries later.[46][43]

Burn also found a repeat of the Battle of Mycale in the Battle of the Eurymedon, fought by the Athenian general Cimon against the Persians in 466 BC.[47] The Persian marshal Masistes would hurl the accusation that the surviving naval commanders were cowards; Burn, however, argues that they were probably trying to get their non-Persian soldiers back to the battlefield.[38]

Analysis

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Mycale and Plataea have great significance in ancient history as the battles which decisively ended the second Persian invasion of Greece, thereby swinging the balance of the Greco-Persian Wars in favour of the Greeks.[45] The Battle of Salamis saved Greece from immediate conquest, but it was Mycale and Plataea which effectively ended that threat.[45] However, neither of these battles are as well known as Thermopylae, Salamis or Marathon. The reason for this discrepancy is not entirely clear; it might however be a result of the circumstances in which the battle was fought. The fame of Thermopylae certainly lies in the doomed heroism of the Greeks in the face of overwhelming numbers;[48] Marathon and Salamis perhaps because they were both fought against the odds, and in dire strategic situations. Conversely, the Battles of Plataea and Mycale were both fought from a relative position of Greek strength, and against lesser odds; perhaps the Greeks were even expecting to win and had certainly seen the opportunity to deal the final blow.[45][49]

The historian George Cawkwell argues that the major military lesson of both Mycale and Plataea was the repeated confirmation of the superiority of the hoplite over the more lightly armed Persian infantry, as had first been demonstrated at Marathon. As a result, after the Greco-Persian Wars the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries.[50]

Burn argues that the destruction of the Persian fleet at Mycale allowed Greek fleets absolute freedom of movement.[38] The Persian and Median marines, as well as the Persian regiments in Tigranes' army, were almost completely massacred. In their absence, the Persian vassals had refused to fight and fled.[a][38]

Historiography

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Main article: Herodotus

The main source for the Greco-Persian Wars is the ancient Greek historian Herodotus. He gives an account of the battle of Mycale in Book Nine of his Histories. The historian Detlev Fehling [de] noted multiple similarities in Herodotus' accounts, which he argued were arbitrary insertions by Herodotus. Fehling noted that the Spartan nauarch (fleet commander) at Mycale had used the same plan used by Themistocles at the Battle of Artemisium, and the Ionian tyrants at the Battle of Lade. Fehling also notes how the shield wall fighting is always concluded by the Athenians in Herodotus' accounts, especially at Plataea and Mycale.[52]

Burn found Herodotus' account to be biased towards the Athenians. He also finds the battle of Mycale to have parallels with the Battle of Plataea, as both battles saw only one flank engaged in combat, and both witnessed fighting at the shield walls and camps of the Persians.[37] Burn states that Mycale was a "relatively small battle", and notes how Thucydides does not consider it as important as Salamis or Artemisium.[38]

Notes

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  1. ^ The presence of 30 Persian marines on board the Persian ships did not allow the Greek vassal soldiers onboard to rebel.[51]

References

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  1. ^ a b According to Herodotus
  2. ^ Lupi 2017, p. 276.
  3. ^ Lupi 2017, pp. 278–279.
  4. ^ a b c Cawkwell 2005, p. 112.
  5. ^ a b c Holland, pp. 333–335.
  6. ^ Holland, pp. 336–338.
  7. ^ a b c Burn 1984, p. 547.
  8. ^ Burn 1984, pp. 547–548.
  9. ^ a b c d Diodorus XI, 19.
  10. ^ a b c Herodotus VIII, 130.
  11. ^ a b c d e f Herodotus IX, 96.
  12. ^ a b c d Diodorus XI, 34.
  13. ^ Herodotus IX, 90.
  14. ^ Connolly 2012, p. 29.
  15. ^ Lazenby 1993, pp. 227–228.
  16. ^ a b c Holland, pp. 357–358.
  17. ^ a b Diodorus XI, 36.
  18. ^ Burn 1984, p. 335.
  19. ^ Burn 1984, p. 336.
  20. ^ Herodotus VIII, 131.
  21. ^ Herodotus VIII, 2.
  22. ^ Herodotus VIII, 48.
  23. ^ a b c Burn 1966, p. 192.
  24. ^ Holland, p. 217.
  25. ^ Lazenby 1993, p. 46.
  26. ^ Goldsworthy 2003, p. 103.
  27. ^ Herodotus VIII, 32.
  28. ^ a b Herodotus IX, 91.
  29. ^ Holland, p. 278.
  30. ^ Holland, pp. 194–197.
  31. ^ a b c Burn 1984, p. 548.
  32. ^ Herodotus, IX, 97.
  33. ^ Herodotus IX, 100.
  34. ^ Green 1996, p. 281.
  35. ^ Burn 1984, p. 549.
  36. ^ Burn 1984, pp. 549–550.
  37. ^ a b c Burn 1984, p. 550.
  38. ^ a b c d e f Burn 1984, p. 551.
  39. ^ Herodotus IX, 103.
  40. ^ Burn 1984, pp. 335–336, 550.
  41. ^ Herodotus IX, 107.
  42. ^ Holland, pp. 358–359.
  43. ^ a b Burn 1984, p. 552.
  44. ^ Burn 1984, pp. 552–553.
  45. ^ a b c d e Holland, pp. 359–363.
  46. ^ Burn 1966, p. 195.
  47. ^ Burn 1966, p. 209.
  48. ^ Holland, pp. xvi–xxii.
  49. ^ Holland, pp. 336–340.
  50. ^ Cawkwell 2005, pp. 251–252.
  51. ^ Burn 1984, p. 502.
  52. ^ Fehling 1971, p. 143.

Bibliography

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Books

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  • Burn, Andrew Robert (1966). The Pelican History of Greece. Penguin Books. ISBN 9780140207927.
  • Burn, Andrew Robert (1984). Persia and the Greeks. The Defence of the West, c. 546-478 B. C. (2nd ed.). Gerald Duckworth & Co. ISBN 9780715617113.
  • Cawkwell, George (2005). The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198148715.001.0001. ISBN 9780198148715.
  • Connolly, Peter (2012). Greece and Rome at War. Frontline Books. ISBN 9781848326095.
  • Fehling, Detlev (1971). Die Quellenangaben bei Herodot: Studien zur Erzählkunst Herodots [The Sources of Herodotus: Studies of Herodotus' Narrative Art]. Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte [Studies in Ancient Literature and History] (in German). Vol. 9. De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110841930. ISBN 9783110036343.
  • Flower, Michael A.; Marincola, John (2002). Herodotus. Histories Book IX. Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521596503.
  • Goldsworthy, Adrian (2003). The Fall of Carthage. Cassel. ISBN 9780304366422.
  • Green, Peter (1996). The Greco-Persian Wars. University of California Press. doi:10.1525/9780520917064. ISBN 9780520203136.
  • Hignett, Charles (1963). Xerxes' Invasion of Greece. Clarendon Press. ISBN 9780198142478.
  • Lazenby, John Francis (1993). The Defence of Greece, 490-479 B.C. Aris & Phillips. ISBN 9780856685910.
  • Lupi, Marcello (2017). "Sparta and the Persian Wars, 499–478". In Powell, Anton (ed.). A Companion to Sparta. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 269–290. doi:10.1002/9781119072379.ch10. ISBN 9781405188692.
  • Rahe, Paul (2015). The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge. Yale Library of Military History. Yale University Press. doi:10.12987/9780300218602. ISBN 978-0-300-11642-7. JSTOR j.ctvmd857x.
  • Shepherd, William (2012). Plataea 479 BC: The Most Glorious Victory Ever Seen. Osprey Campaign Series. Vol. 239. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781849085540.
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37°41′27″N 27°09′27″E / 37.6909°N 27.1574°E / 37.6909; 27.1574

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